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HUMAN RIGHTS THE “ASEAN WAY”:
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A
REGIONAL ADR AND ADJUDICATIVE BODY IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Mariam Sarwar*
I. INTRODUCTION
With regards to international human rights law, academics have
described Asia as a “black hole,”1 or “the last frontier”2 in regional
human rights cooperation, and perhaps with good reason. Whereas
Europe, Africa, and the Americas have had regional legal systems for
human rights enforcement for years, Asia has yet to establish a
concrete and legally binding regional mechanism to redress human
rights violations. This may, however, be poised to change. Within the
last decade, the Association of Southeast Asian3 Nations (“ASEAN”
or “Association”) has increasingly made human rights a priority in
their regional operations. The Association created a human rights
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, CA; B.A., Anthropology
and Psychology, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, MI. With sincere thanks to Professor Mary
Hansel for her guidance, Professor Hiro Aragaki for his feedback, Professor Lauren Willis for her
support, the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work in editing this
Note, and my family for their love and encouragement.
1. Nicholas Doyle, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Implications of Recent
Southeast Asian Initiatives in Human Rights Institution-Building and Standard-Setting, 63 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 67, 70 (2014) (“When considering the architecture of the international human rights
system, Asia seems to be something of a ‘black hole’.”).
2. Ben Saul et al., The Last Frontier of Human Rights Protection: Interrogating Resistance
to Regional Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 18 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 23, 23–24 (2011) (“While
regional mechanisms for human rights protection were established in Europe in 1950, the Americas
from 1959, Africa from 1981, and among Arab States from 2004, the Asia-Pacific has long been
the last frontier of regional cooperation.”).
3. Hao Duy Phan, a legal expert in international law, has described “Southeast Asia” as
geographically comprising of “the area south of China and to the east and southeast of India,
covering the continental Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia,
Singapore, and Malaysia) and archipelagic Southeast Asia (Malaysian Sabah, Brunei, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Timor-Leste).” Hao Duy Phan, A Selective Approach to Establishing a Human
Rights Mechanism in Southeast Asia: The Case for a Southeast Asian Court of Human Rights, in
29 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MONOGRAPH SERIES 2 n.8 (Roger S. Clark
eds., 2012).
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commission in 2009, adopted a human rights declaration in 2012, and
has begun to develop initiatives with member state judiciaries to
improve human rights enforcement in domestic courts.4
The primary roadblock to ASEAN’s regional human rights
development has been its adherence to an ideology known as the
“ASEAN Way,” which is enshrined in many of ASEAN’s legal
instruments and continues to shape the ways in which member states
interact with each other. The “ASEAN Way” is primarily
characterized by the principle of non-interference—states are highly
deferent to domestic sovereignty, reluctant to meddle in the internal
affairs of other member states, and can only enact change with the
consensus of all members.5 Though this ideology has served to
maintain a level of peace and harmony amongst ASEAN states, it has
also fostered an environment in which ASEAN members do not hold
each other accountable for human rights violations.
For example, ASEAN has hardly even condemned the ongoing
Rohingya crisis within the member state of Myanmar, let alone taken
steps to stop the persecution and exile of the Rohingya population.6
ASEAN’s actions (or lack thereof) in the face of human rights
violations in the region highlights the persistent nature of the “ASEAN
Way,” and reinforces the need for an examination into how ASEAN
can improve their mechanisms for addressing human rights violations.
This Note explores ways in which ASEAN can strengthen its
legal capacity to provide redress for human rights violations in
Southeast Asia, and proposes that Alternative Dispute Resolution

4. See Yvonne Xin Wang, Contextualizing Universal Human Rights: An Integrated Human
Rights Framework for ASEAN, 25 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 385, 387 (2015); Council of ASEAN
Chief Justices (CACJ), PEJABAT KETUA PENDAFTAR MAHKAMAH, PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA
[Chief
Registrar’s
Office
of
the
Court,
Federation
of
Malaysia],
http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/ms/mengenai-kami/hubungan-kehakiman-antarabangsa/councilasean-chief-justices-cacj (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
5. Phan, supra note 3, at 113.
6. See, e.g., Anis Shakirah Mohd Muslimin, ASEAN’s Rohingya Response: Barely a Peep
Outside of Malaysia, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
anismuslimin/2017/12/17/aseans-rohingya-response-barely-a-peep-outside-ofmalaysia/#1ad7d65939de; JC Gotinga, ASEAN Summit Silence on Rohingya ‘an Absolute
Travesty’, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/asean-summitsilence-rohingya-absolute-travesty-171114211156144.html; John Chalmers, Southeast Asia
Summit Draft Statement Skips Over Rohingya Crisis, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2017, 8:13 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit-myanmar/southeast-asia-summit-draftstatement-skips-over-rohingya-crisis-idUSKBN1DD0CP.
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(ADR) is a promising and realistic means for the Association to
improve its human rights enforcement.
Part II of this Note discusses ASEAN as an organization and
outlines the two interconnected ideologies which pervade ASEAN’s
actions and severely stagnate its ability to protect human rights. Part
III evaluates some of ASEAN’s key human rights instruments and
initiatives for the purpose of outlining deficiencies that merit changing
to better protect human rights in member states. Finally, Part IV
discusses how ASEAN can strengthen its legal ability to address
human rights violations through alternative dispute resolutions, with
the ultimate goal of establishing a regional human rights court to
provide binding adjudicative decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
ASEAN was first established in 1967 when Indonesia, Singapore,
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand signed the Association into
existence through the Bangkok Declaration.7 ASEAN membership
grew over the years to include Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos
and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.8 The Association was
largely created as a security entity, both to prevent the proliferation of
communist ideology in the region and to solidify alliances amongst
the member states, many of whom were newly independent or in the
process of decolonizing after years of oppressive colonial rule.9
According to the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the main aims of the
Association were to “accelerate the economic growth, social progress
and cultural development in the region,” as well as to promote
“regional peace and stability” and “active collaboration and mutual
assistance.”10

7. Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, I.L.M. 1233,
1233 (1967) [hereinafter ASEAN Declaration]. The ASEAN Declaration is also known as the
Bangkok Declaration.
8. ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW: ASEAN 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION, A COMPENDIUM 4 (2017),
http://asean.org/storage/2017/08/12.-July-2017-AICHR-What-You-Need-to-Know-CompendiumFINAL.pdf
9. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS, 2, (2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/asean/asean-human-rightsdeclaration-legal-analysis-2014.authcheckdam.pdf.
10. ASEAN Declaration, supra note 7, at 1234.
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A. The ASEAN Way
At its inception, ASEAN did not purport to have any mandate
regarding the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia.11 To the
contrary, member states pledged to uphold principles of state
sovereignty and non-interference in internal state affairs.12 This
ideology was officially enshrined as a “guiding principle for
ASEAN”13 with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia in 1976.14 Article 2 of the treaty reads:
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting
Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental
principles:
(a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty,
equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all
nations;
(b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free
from external interference, subversion or coersion [sic];
(c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
(d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
(e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
(f) Effective cooperation among themselves.15
Though not explicitly stated as such in the treaty, this ideology
has become widely known as the “ASEAN Way” and is considered
11. Yuval Ginbar, Human Rights in ASEAN—Setting Sail or Treading Water?, 10 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 504, 505–06 (2010) (“When Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand
established ASEAN in 1967, regional stability and economic cooperation were at the forefront of
both their motives and declared aims. To a large extent this remains the case today. Human rights,
on the other hand, were not even mentioned in ASEAN’s constitutive Declaration.”).
12. Phan, supra note 3, at 108–09.
13. Id. at 108.
14. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 27 I.L.M. 610 (1988).
15. Id. at art. 2.
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“the oldest and most important norm adopted and internalized by
ASEAN states which has been central to the conduct of ASEAN
relations so far.”16
Given the historical context in which ASEAN was conceived, this
approach made sense—in the aftermath of colonial intervention and
the Cold War, member states sought to maintain control over their
nations while facing ongoing threats of external encroachment, border
disputes, and internal secessionism.17 However, the “ASEAN Way”
also favored those ASEAN state governments still exercising
autocratic rule and arguably made it even easier for human rights
violations within the region to go unaddressed.
B. Dissonance Between the “ASEAN Way” and Human Rights
According to Dr. Hao Duy Phan, a legal expert in international
law, the “ASEAN Way” represents a vestige of traditional village
decision-making processes and is characterized by four main
elements: “(1) respect for the internal affairs of other members; (2)
non-confrontation and quiet diplomacy; (3) non-recourse to use or
threat to use of force; and (4) decision-making through consensus,
which is unique to ASEAN.”18 The “ASEAN Way” ideology has been
successful in certain respects for the Association, as it helped to
maintain stability in the region, reduce conflicts, strengthen
cooperation, and build trust among the member states.19 The amity
furnished by adherence to this principle, in turn, allowed for ASEAN
to focus their efforts on economic development and attracting foreign
investment.20
In terms of human rights, however, the “ASEAN Way” is
inherently problematic. By following tenets of non-confrontation and
“quiet diplomacy,” states are dissuaded from criticizing the policies or
actions of other states.21 ASEAN states are thus reluctant to hold each
16. Doyle, supra note 1, at 71; Phan, supra note 3, at 108.
17. Amrita Kapur, Asian Values v. The Paper Tiger: Dismantling the Threat to Asian Values
Posed by the International Criminal Court, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1059, 1063 (2013); see also
Phan, supra note 3, at 114 (“[‘The ASEAN Way’] was relevant during the Cold War period when
security was traditionally defined as security of territory from external aggression or as protection
of national interests in foreign policy.”).
18. Phan, supra note 3, at 113.
19. Id. at 114.
20. Daniel Aguirre & Irene Pietropaoli, Human Rights Protection the ASEAN Way: NonIntervention and the Newest Regional Rights System, 1 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 276, 278 (2012).
21. Phan, supra note 3, at 113–14.
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other accountable for the numerous human rights abuses committed
within the region.22 This, coupled with ineffective domestic remedies
to address human rights violations, gives victims of human rights
abuses few avenues of recourse for their plights.23
Furthermore, ASEAN’s requirements of a consensus for
decision-making essentially amounts to giving each member state veto
authority, such that “ASEAN decisions could not be adopted if even
one member country consistently rejects it.”24 This severely hinders
ASEAN’s decision-making process, particularly because “[d]iverse
political, cultural, and economic positions within the region make
forming consensus around norms difficult.”25 Thus, despite the
stability that adherence to the “ASEAN Way” brought to Southeast
Asia for the newly-independent member states, the principle as a
whole does not facilitate the establishment of external legally-binding
mechanisms enforceable within each state’s domestic legal system.
C. Resistance to the Rise of Human Rights in Asia
Human rights law gained increasing international support in the
1990s, culminating in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action at the World Conference of Human Rights in 1993 which
reasserted the need for states to promote and protect human rights.26
The declaration states:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States,
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems,

22. See Hien Bui, The ASEAN Human Rights System: A Critical Analysis, 11 ASIAN J. COMP.
L. 111, 114 (2016) (“ASEAN has been consistently unenthusiastic in reacting to violations
committed by its member states, choosing to ‘remain[] silent’ and ‘powerless’ in the face of the
many human rights abuses in the region.”).
23. See Aguirre & Pietropaoli, supra note 20, at 281–82.
24. Phan, supra note 3, at 114.
25. Wang, supra note 4, at 398.
26. G.A. Res. 48/121, (Feb. 14, 1994).
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to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.27
Around the same time that the international human rights
movement was gaining momentum in the West, a new opposing
ideology began to gain popularity in parts of Asia. What became
known as the “Asian Values” theory was largely a form of resistance
to what was deemed to be an imposition of Western human rights
norms on Asia.28 The debate about “Asian Values” was “shaped by
the juxtaposition of cultural relativism against developmental
universalism and ‘Western’ human rights.”29 The ideology espoused
that allegedly “Asian” beliefs and values were incompatible with
“Western” ideas of human rights, and that the attempt to spread
“Western” values was a “modern extension of imperialism.”30
According to Dr. Chang-Yau Hoon, a professor and researcher
specializing in Asian studies, the rise of the “Asian Values” debate
occurred because Asia’s economic prosperity at the time bolstered
enough confidence in the region to challenge the Western hegemony.
Moreover, many countries in the region still harbored a deep-seated
resentment against the West for decades of colonialist rule and
oppression in the region.31
Hoon describes four main beliefs that underpin the “Asian
Values” ideology: 1) Human rights are not universal and thus cannot
be universally applied. The form that human rights take depends on
“particular social, economic, cultural and political conditions”; 2)
society should focus on the family rather than the individual, thereby
justifying the view that the interest of the country (as a “family”) can
and should override that of a single citizen; 3) social and economic
rights take precedence over the rights of the individual; and 4) part of
a country’s right to self-determination is the ability to exercise
27. ASEAN, ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION AND THE PHNOM PENH STATEMENT OF
ADOPTION OF THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION (AHRD), art. 7, (2012),
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf
[hereinafter
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration].
28. Chang Yau Hoon, Revisiting the ‘Asian Values’ Argument Used by Asian Political
Leaders and Its Validity, 32 INDONESIAN Q. 154, 154–55 (2004) (“After the end of the Cold War,
the United States had enlarged its scope of democracy and the promotion of human rights in its
foreign policy. This universalistic claim of human rights was seen by the economically dynamic
and increasingly self-assertive East Asian regimes as an ideological compliment to Western
domination.”).
29. Kapur, supra note 17, at 1063.
30. Saul et al., supra note 2, at 30.
31. Hoon, supra note 28, at 155.
THE
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domestic jurisdiction over human rights without outside
interference.32
These ideas were most vocally championed by former Malaysian
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and former Singaporean
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.33 In a famous interview with journalist
and CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria, Yew stated:
Asian societies are unlike Western ones. The fundamental
difference between Western concepts of society and
government and East Asian concepts . . . is that Eastern
societies believe that the individual exists in the context of
his family. He is not pristine and separate. The family is part
of the extended family, and then friends and the wider
society.34
Yew criticized democracy as leading to “undisciplined and disorderly
conditions which are inimical to development,” and boasted that
Eastern cultures maintained order by placing more value in economic
growth and national security than human rights.35
Indeed, the “Asian Values” ideology supported paternalistic
forms of state authority in which “a nation is like a big family, the
government is seen as the unchallengeable ‘father’ who is obliged to
exercise both the disciplinarian and custodial roles, and the society is
deemed to be the children who ought to obey the father in all
circumstances.”36 As a consequence of this paternalistic leadership,
however, states were able to justify intrusive and oppressive policies
in the name of the greater good of the nation, and to keep
governmental affairs largely shrouded in secrecy and thus vulnerable
to corruption.37 In contrast to what were deemed to be essential “Asian
Values”—consensus, harmony, unity and community—the “Asian
Values” movement largely served as an ideological tool to validate

32. Id.
33. MICHAEL D. BARR, CULTURAL POLITICS AND ASIAN VALUES: THE TEPID WAR 3–4
(Routledge 2002).
34. Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 109, 113.
35. Ishaan Tharoor, What Lee Kuan Yew Got Wrong About Asia, WASH. POST
(Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/23/what-leekuan-yew-got-wrong-about-asia/?utm_term=.428c51153714.
36. Hoon, supra note 28, at 156–57.
37. Id. at 160.
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authoritarian rule and insulate states from criticism for human rights
violations.38
The idea of “Asian Values” was “largely discredited” and ceased
to be a driving force in Asian politics “after the 1997 Asian financial
crisis exposed the fragility of some [Asian] governments.”39 However,
the effects of the “Asian Values” ideology remain enshrined in
ASEAN’s actions relating to human rights, as tensions endure between
ASEAN’s “[c]ollectivist notions of rights” and “western societies’
individualist framework.”40 “Asian Values” ideas are still adopted by
some ASEAN countries to justify human rights abuses.41
In summary, the “Asian Values” ideology fell in line with the
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention espoused by the
“ASEAN Way”: “Asian Values” effectively contributed to the
“ASEAN Way” ideology and helped to create an opposition between
the principle of non-intervention and that of universal human rights.
Together, the “ASEAN Way” and “Asian Values” ideals severely
stagnated ASEAN’s willingness to adopt human rights norms.
In the midst of the rise of human rights initiatives and the “Asian
Values” debate, the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights
Commission began to pass resolutions pressuring states in Asia to
establish a regional mechanism for human rights.42 Under this
mounting international scrutiny, ASEAN finally added human rights
to its agenda in 1993.43
At the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN
Foreign Ministers agreed to “consider the establishment of an
appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”44 However, they
undermined this reluctant concession by reasserting the familiar norms
which underpin the “ASEAN Way”: “[The Foreign Ministers]
emphasized that the protection and promotion of human rights in the
38. Id. at 155–56.
39. Tharoor, supra note 35.
40. James Gomez & Robin Ramcharan, Evaluating Competing “Democratic” Discourses:
The Impact on Human Rights Protection in Southeast Asia, 33 J. CURRENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN
AFF., no. 3, 2014, at 49, 54.
41. Phan, supra note 3, at 79 (“Countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam
still rely on [the “Asian Values”] idea to counter criticisms of their human rights records, or argue
against what they call Western imposition of human rights values.”).
42. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/168 (Dec. 18, 1990); G.A. Res. 43/140 (Dec. 8, 1988); G.A. Res.
41/153 (Dec. 4, 1986).
43. Phan, supra note 3, at 2.
44. Joint Communiqué of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 23–24, 1993),
ASEAN.
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international community should take cognizance of the principles of
respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in the internal affairs of states.”45 Perhaps unsurprisingly
then, it would be another fifteen years before ASEAN would take
action to establish an ASEAN regional human rights mechanism by
ratifying the ASEAN Charter.46
III. ASEAN’S EXISTING LEGAL MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS
A. The ASEAN Charter and the Formation of the AICHR
ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Charter in 2007, and
it was subsequently ratified by all ten member states in 2008.47 As
stated in the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005, the Charter
“serve[s] as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN” and
“codif[ies] all ASEAN norms, rules, and values.”48 The adoption of
the Charter was a watershed moment for ASEAN, as it turned “the
hitherto loose ‘Association’ into a union consolidated by a legally
binding treaty.”49 In effect, the Charter invested ASEAN with a legal
identity independent from its member states, thereby giving the
Association the legal capacity to act on behalf of the region.50
The ASEAN Charter commits ASEAN to upholding human
rights while conversely adding that such rights are to be considered in
light of ASEAN’s principles of non-interference and state
sovereignty.51 The Charter’s section delineating ASEAN’s
“Principles” illustrates this conflicting duality:
ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with
the following Principles:

45. Id.
46. See Phan, supra note 3, at 3.
47. Ginbar, supra note 11, at 504.
48. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter
(Dec. 12, 2005), http://asean.org/?static_post=kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-the-establishment-ofthe-asean-charter-kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005.
49. Ginbar, supra note 11, at 504.
50. Phan, supra note 3, at 103.
51. See ASEAN Charter art. 2.
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(a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN
Member states;
....
(e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN
Member States;
(f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its
national existence free from external interference, subversion
and coercion;
....
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and
protection of human rights, and the promotion of social
justice;
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international
law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to
by ASEAN Member States . . . .52
The Charter further holds that the purpose of ASEAN is “[t]o
strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law,
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States
of ASEAN.”53 As noted by Phan, the specific “rights and
responsibilities” of states are not explained in the Charter, thus leaving
the door open for human rights violations to be committed.54 By
qualifying its human rights commitments against a commitment to
state rights, the Charter undermines the universality and inalienable
nature of human rights55 in a manner which is consistent with the

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
Phan, supra note 3, at 106.
Id.
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“ASEAN Way” and shows vestiges of the so-called “Asian Values”
arguments.
Of particular importance, Article 14 of the Charter committed
ASEAN to create a human rights body. The ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was
created in 2009 and consists of ten members, each appointed as a
representative by each one of the member states.56 The AICHR Terms
of Reference commit the commission “[t]o promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN,”57
but the document is still dominated by the familiar “culture-rights
juxtaposition” which qualifies human rights against member state
rights for sovereignty and non-interference.
For example, the document states that the AICHR must “promote
human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind national
and regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the
balance between rights and responsibilities.”58 This echoes the ideas
of state paternalism espoused by the “Asian Values” argument59 by
implying that State and communal responsibility can outweigh and
override individual human rights.
The Terms of Reference commit the AICHR to promote human
rights in a variety of ways, including by enhancing public awareness,
initiating capacity building to implement international human rights
treaty obligations, providing consultation and advisory services, and
encouraging ASEAN states to ratify international human rights
instruments. Notably, however, while promoting human rights is
reiterated throughout the AICHR’s mandate and functions, means of
actively protecting human rights are not addressed.60 The document
does “not envisage the AICHR having any judicial mandate nor
providing any legal channel for the receiving and considering of
complaints concerning alleged violations of human rights by memberStates.”61
56. Wang, supra note 4, at 389.
57. ASEAN, ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (TERMS OF
REFERENCE),
3
(2009)
[hereinafter
Terms
of
Reference]
https://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/publications/TOR-of-AICHR.pdf.
58. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
59. Hoon, supra note 28, at 156–57.
60. See ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27.
61. Doyle, supra note 1, at 73.
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Perhaps as a result, the AICHR faced wide criticism for its
inability to act and has been given the moniker of being “toothless.”62
For example, in an article entitled Asia’s Toothless Council, The Wall
Street Journal noted:
ASEAN’s commission will make decisions by consensus—
meaning authoritarian regimes like Burma, Laos and
Vietnam can wield veto power. Individual governments can
appoint or remove commissioners as they see fit.
Independent observers aren’t included on the commission. It
wouldn’t be surprising to see ASEAN’s misfits use the group
as an excuse to whitewash their own human-rights
violations . . . .63
These concerns appear to have been founded. Indeed, the articles
outlining basic principles in both the AICHR terms of reference and
the ASEAN Charter place non-interference first and above conformity
to human rights.
B. The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
In 2012, the AICHR appointed representatives from each member
state to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD or the
“Declaration”).64 On its face, this seemed to be a big step for ASEAN
towards becoming a regional enforcer of human rights.65 The existing
regional human rights systems in Europe, Africa, and the Americas
are made of three key components: first, and central to the entire
system, a legally binding human rights convention which outlines
human rights commitments for the region; second, a commission,
62. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF
UNION, ASEAN CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: RULE OF LAW, JUDICIARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 6
(2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433716/EXPOAFET_NT(2013)433716_EN.pdf (“The ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Commission
(AICHR) is ‘toothless.’”); James Gomez & Robin Ramcharan, The Protection of Human Rights in
Southeast Asia: Improving the Effectiveness of Civil Society, 13 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. & L., no.
3, 2012, at 27 (“CSOs, who were sparingly consulted in the process of creation of the ASEAN
Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights, have early on criticized its Terms of Reference
(TORs) which provided for a ‘toothless’ mechanism that failed to provide for real ‘protection.’”);
Asean’s Toothless Council, WALL STREET J.: OPINION (July 22, 2009 4:45
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203517304574303592053848748; Wang,
supra note 4, at 392 (“Among commentators and human rights advocates, criticisms of the ASEAN
Commission abound. It has been called ‘the world’s most toothless human-rights body,’ ‘a lame
duck,’ and mere ‘window dressing.’”).
63. Asean’s Toothless Council, supra note 62.
64. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 4.
65. Wang, supra note 4, at 396.
THE
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which monitors and applies the convention; and third, a court, which
enforces obligations from the convention.66 With the AICHR in place,
the AHRD had the potential of being the binding convention central
to ASEAN’s regional human rights system. Unfortunately, the
document fell short.
The AHRD drew criticism from its very inception.67 The drafting
process was controversial because it was largely done in secret and
without any form of consultation outside of ASEAN.68 Civil society
organizations (“CSOs”), who sought to provide input to the document,
were kept out of the highly secretive drafting process.69 When finally
adopted in 2012, the AHRD continued to disappoint.70
The Declaration fails to recognize certain basic rights, such as the
right to self-determination, the right of freedom of association, and the
rights of indigenous peoples.71 Provisions within the AHRD also
continue to espouse the idea of context-based rights, alluding that,
under the appropriate circumstances, states do not have to adhere to
human rights standards.
For example, Article 7 of the AHRD, while stating that “[a]ll
human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated,” adds that “[a]t the same time, the realisation of human
rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing
in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical
and religious backgrounds.”72 This clearly alludes to the “ASEAN
Way” mentality and “leaves unresolved the awkward tension between
the aspiration to endorse universal human rights and the reluctance to
cede state sovereignty.”73

66. Id. at 401.
67. See, e.g., Coalition Slams Secrecy in Human Rights Declaration’s Drafting, JAKARTA
GLOBE (June 12, 2012), http://jakartaglobe.id/archive/coalition-slams-secrecy-in-human-rightsdeclarations-drafting/ (“‘The AICHR has really been secretive in dealing with a document that will
impact the lives of the 580 million people who live in Asean,’ Yuyun told the Jakarta Globe on
Sunday. She said that since July 21 when the first meeting of the drafting group was held, there had
not been any consultations with stakeholders, including civil society representatives, victims of
human rights violations or others. ‘There are grounds for suspicion and worries about the process,’
Yuyun said, adding that so far the AICHR had also never made any draft of the declaration public
or even available to the stakeholders.”)
68. Wang, supra note 4, at 396.
69. Id.
70. See AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 4.
71. Wang, supra note 4, at 396.
72. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 7.
73. Wang, supra note 4, at 397.
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Perhaps the most problematic provision of the Declaration is in
Article 8, which states:
The human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person
shall be exercised with due regard to the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of others. The exercise of human
rights and fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of others, and to meet the just
requirements of national security, public order, public health,
public safety, public morality, as well as the general welfare
of the peoples in a democratic society.74
Article 8 does not recognize a fundamental principle in international
human rights law: that certain human rights, such as the right to
freedom from slavery or torture, are inviolable and non-derogable
under any circumstances.75 Instead, it implies that states can violate
human rights in the name of “national security, public order, public
health, public safety, public morality [and the] general welfare of the
peoples.”76 This, in practice, gives states wide latitude to justify
human rights abuses by claiming it is for the purposes of something as
nondescript as “public morality.”
As stated by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, “All
rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. While
international human rights law allows for legitimate limitations,
derogations and reservations, they must be exercised under strict
circumstances. Even in exceptional situations, certain core human
rights must apply at all times.”77 Accordingly, while other
international agreements have similar provisions for suspending
individual rights in situations of national security and safety, these

74. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8.
75. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 7.
76. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8.
77. U.N. High Comm’r of Human Rights, OHCHR Research and Right to Dev. Div., Core
Human Rights in the Two Covenants (Sept. 2013), https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/
Page%20Documents/Core%20Human%20Rights.pdf (listing examples of non-derogable human
rights) (emphasis added); see U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994).
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provisions explicitly state that even in times of crisis, certain human
rights may not be suspended.78
Article 8 of the AHRD contains no such provision.79 Furthermore,
the article lacks provisions to ensure that any suspension or restriction
of human rights is 1) legal under international law; 2) implemented to
satisfy legitimate aims; and 3) proportionate in scope to the need for
the suspension or restriction.80
For these reasons and more, the AHRD has drawn criticism from
the international community. In response to the drafting of the AHRD,
the UN Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures of the
Human Rights Council (“UN Committee”) penned an open letter
expressing their concern with the document.81 With regards to Article
7, the UN Committee criticized the nature of this balancing of rights,
asserting that “advocating a balance between human rights and duties
creates much greater scope for Governments to place arbitrary,
disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions on human rights.”82 The
UN Committee noted that “[t]here should be no such provision in a
human rights instrument, whose primary purpose is to protect
individuals and groups against the misuse and abuse of State power.”83
The UN Committee also expressed concern over Article 8 of the
AHRD, stating that “[w]ith regard to legitimate restrictions, under
78. See, e.g., Org. of Am. States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San
Jose, Costa Rica (B-32) art. 27. Article 27(1) has a similar provision to Article 8 of the AHRD,
stating that “[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or
security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the present
Convention to the extent and the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law
and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social
origin.” Id. However, this provision is followed by Article 27(2), which cautions that “The
foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to
Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6
(Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of
Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article
19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in
Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.” Id.
(emphasis added).
79. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, supra note 27, at art. 8.
80. Bui, supra note 22, at 128.
81. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain International Standards, An Open
Letter from the Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council
on the draft ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/
LetterASEAN_Nov2012.doc [hereinafter ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain
International Standards].
82. Id.
83. Id.
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certain conditions, on the grounds of ‘morality’, ‘public order’ and
‘national security’, special procedures mandate holders are acutely
aware of the risk of these terms being used as a pretext by
Governments to place arbitrary, disproportionate and unnecessary
restrictions on human rights.”84
The American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative (“Rule of
Law Initiative”) wrote a legal analysis of the AHRD shortly after it
was drafted under the assumption “that ASEAN will eventually
develop a regional human rights convention similar to the American,
African and European Conventions, and that the AHRD will form the
basis of such a Convention,”85 and also expressed concern over the
omission of key human rights and limitations placed on human rights
enforcement.86 The Rule of Law Initiative theorized that Article 7 may
be an attempt to “infuse the AHRD with a regional flavour,” but noted
that “the language raises some concerns.”87 They also noted that
Article 8’s “limitation clause” could be used by member states to
justify derogation from established human rights principles.88
Both the UN Committee and the Rule of Law Initiative concluded
that ASEAN must redraft the document with input from CSOs and
others in the region, and ensure that the document better mandates
compliance with international human rights laws.89 The Rule of Law
Initiative added that before the AHRD can become a binding
convention for the region, it must also establish “the machinery
required to establish an effective treaty enforcement mechanism.”90
C. The Legal Effect of ASEAN Instruments and Mechanisms
Thus far, all ASEAN human rights documents, including the
ASEAN Charter, the AICHR Terms of Reference, and the AHRD, are
non-binding on ASEAN states and constitute “soft law.”91 As such,
these documents have recommendatory status and nothing more.92
84. Id.
85. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 2.
86. Id. at 7–8.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 7.
89. ASEAN Human Rights Declaration Should Maintain International Standards, supra note
81, at 2; AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 9.
90. AM. BAR ASS’N RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 9.
91. TAN HSIEN-LI, THE ASEAN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
INSTITUTIONALISING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 177 (2011).
92. Id.
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The AICHR itself is only a consultative intergovernmental body
which, unlike other regional human rights commissions, does not
receive, analyze, or investigate claims of human rights abuses.93
Though the AICHR’s terms of reference decree that the AICHR must
protect human rights, they lack a mandate to do more than conduct
capacity building and awareness-raising initiatives.94 None of
ASEAN’s human rights instruments or initiatives establish a
complaints mechanism to allow for individuals to report human rights
violations, nor do they posit a system for remedying for human rights
abuses through any form of punishment on member states or human
rights violators.95
In practice, the AICHR’s activities have mainly taken the form of
organizing conferences and seminars throughout the region related to
human rights,96 while ASEAN and the AICHR have remained largely
silent in the face of actual human rights abuses in the region.97 In fact,
there is research to suggest that ASEAN has been as inactive in
condemning and acting against human rights abuses since the
formation of the AICHR as it was before the AICHR even existed.98
Following a recent military coup in Thailand, the Thai military even
lobbied ASEAN for support for their military regime and arbitrary
exercises of power.99
For a more recent example of ASEAN and the AICHR’s
complacency towards human rights violations, one need look no
further than the ongoing Rohingya crisis in ASEAN member state
Myanmar. The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority from the
Rakhine State, one of the poorest states in Myanmar.100 Though the
Rohingya have faced discrimination for years at the hands of extremist
and ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups,101 “the recent level of violence

93. Bui, supra note 22, at 131–32.
94. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE
UNION, supra note 62.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Bui, supra note 22, at 118.
99. Id. at 117–18.
100. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims
and Other Minorities in Myanmar, ¶ 9, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/18 (June 28, 2016).
101. U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of OHCHR Mission to
Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar Since 9 October 2016, 5
(Feb. 3, 2017).
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is unprecedented.”102 In what has been dubbed the “fastest growing
refugee crisis in the world”103 and “the biggest humanitarian crisis that
we’re facing right now in the 21st century,”104 the Rohingya
population has been subject to “the killing of babies, toddlers,
children, women and elderly; opening fire at people fleeing; burning
of entire villages; massive detention; massive and systematic rape and
sexual violence; [and] deliberate destruction of food and sources of
food.”105 The violence and destruction has been perpetrated by the
Myanmar Armed Forces, the Border Guard Police Force of Myanmar,
police forces of Myanmar, and non-Rohingya Rakhine forces recently
integrated into the security forces,106 and has resulted in over 600,000
Rohingya fleeing to nearby countries such as Bangladesh for refuge.107
With the exception of condemnation by Muslim-majority
countries Malaysia and Indonesia, ASEAN has been predominantly
silent in the face of this crisis.108 For example, at a 2017 ASEAN
Summit meeting, the “Chairman’s Statement,” which provides a
summation of the group’s discussions, did not even mention the
Rohingya.109 The sole reference to the Rohingya crisis was a
commendation for the delivery of relief items to “the affected
communities in Northern Rakhine State, Myanmar.”110 Even the
AICHR has failed to respond to the crisis.111 This is a glaring omission
for a commission tasked with upholding human rights.
102. Id. at 41.
103. Muslimin, supra note 6.
104. Gotinga, supra note 6.
105. U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 101, at 41.
106. Id. at 11–12.
107. Southeast Asia Summit Draft Statement Skips Over Rohingya Crisis, supra note 6.
108. Muslimin, supra note 6.
109. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response and the Fifth Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management, ¶ 6,
(Oct. 19, 2017), http://asean.org/storage/2017/10/Final-Chairmans-Statement-5th-AMMDM-6thCOP-to-AADMER-19-Oct-2017.pdf.
110. Id.
111. See Indah P. Amaritasari, ASEAN Rights Body Absent in Massacre of Rohingya JAKARTA
POST (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:05 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/09/12/aseanrights-body-absent-in-massacre-of-rohingya.html (“The absence of any effective response on the
part of the AICHR toward human rights violations of international human rights law amounts to
ASEAN perpetuating the culture of impunity of its member states. . . . The AICHR’s lack of
response to the situation of human rights of the Rohingya can foster organized criminal abuse of
state power. The ASEAN human rights system does not have any such system of interim,
precautionary or provisional measures in place to protect victims or those at imminent risk of being
victimized.”).
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D. The Council of ASEAN Chief Justices
Despite its clear shortcomings, ASEAN has made progress
towards unifying judicial practices and institutionalizing human rights
norms within the domestic judiciaries of its member states. Given the
aversion that ASEAN members have traditionally had for outside
intervention and change, these initiatives represent an important step
for human rights within the region.
The Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ or the “Council”)
was created in 2013, and has met annually since their inception.112 As
indicated by the name, the Council is comprised of the Chief Justices
and Heads of the ten ASEAN domestic judiciaries.113 The Council
aims to establish “adherence to the rule of law and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, ensuring that ASEAN member
states and denizens live in peace with the world at large in a just
environment,”114 and delineated the following objectives at their
initial meeting:
(a) Promote close relations and mutual understanding
amongst the ASEAN judiciaries;
(b) Provide a regular forum for the ASEAN Chief Justices to
discuss and exchange views on common issues facing the
ASEAN judiciaries; and
(c) Facilitate judicial cooperation and collaboration among
ASEAN judiciaries with a view to accelerate the economic
growth and development of the ASEAN region.115
The CACJ submitted formal accreditation documentation to the
ASEAN Secretary-General in 2016,116 and became an official entity
of ASEAN in January 2017 when the CACJ was added to Annex 2 of
the ASEAN Charter.117
112. Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ), supra note 4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See ASEAN Chief Justices Meet in Brunei, PEOPLE’S ARMY NEWSPAPER (Mar. 25, 2017),
http://en.qdnd.vn/asean-community/asean-news/asean-chief-justices-meet-in-brunei-479361.
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The CACJ has already taken several initiatives towards
integrating judiciaries in ASEAN. At the third CACJ meeting in 2015,
the Council pledged to create an English-language portal of laws
across the region.118 It is hoped that this portal will create more
transparent judicial processes in the region and delineate
understandable court regulations for litigants.119 This portal, which is
expected to be up and running by 2018, will be sponsored by the
Norwegian government.120 Additionally, each country has agreed to
submit a report on legal regulations of civil procedure in their
respective countries so that the Council’s working group can design a
“model law” to serve as a reference for all member countries.121
Countries will also submit reports on their case management
procedures for the CACJ working group to create a referential
procedure.122
Beyond unifying laws, the CACJ also seeks to integrate and
enhance judicial training in the region. A working group headed by
Indonesia and the Philippines has conducted annual workshops for
ASEAN judges on various topics of the law, the third of which was
held in 2017 and focused on international human rights.123 Currently,
few ASEAN countries train their judges on ASEAN instruments or
international law. This relatively new initiative may significantly help
increase awareness of international law norms (including international
human rights law norms) amongst ASEAN members.
The CACJ collaborated with the AICHR to host the Judicial
Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding International
Human Rights Law (the “Colloquium”) in March of 2017.124 The
Colloquium “aimed to strengthen judicial cooperation and encourage
greater peer-to-peer interaction between relevant stakeholders, and to
provide a platform to share good practices and challenges in the

118. ‘Rule of Law Must Prevail as ASEAN Integrates’, RAPPLER (Mar. 3, 2015, 8:57 PM),
https://www.rappler.com/video/reports/85669-rule-of-law-asean-integration.
119. Buena Bernal, SC: Efficient Courts Vital to ASEAN Integration, RAPPLER (Mar. 1, 2015,
6:20 PM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85403-sc-court-vital-asean-integration.
120. ASEAN Chief Justices Meet in Brunei, supra note 117.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ), supra note 4.
124. ASEAN Shares Good Practices on International Human Rights Law, ASEAN
SECRETARIAT
NEWS,
(Mar. 20, 2017),
http://asean.org/asean-shares-good-practices-oninternational-human-rights-law/.
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implementation of international human rights laws in ASEAN.”125
Participants at the conference discussed ways in which to implement
the AHRD in the region.126
In his opening speech, the Secretary General of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Malaysia stated that, “[t]he Judiciaries’ discussion
on international and regional instruments in the Colloquium will serve
to advance a greater understanding and acceptance of human rights
norms in the region,” and further emphasized the key role played by
the judiciary in serving as a means of check and balance on other
branches of government.127
The three-day conference closed with the adoption of the
Colloquium’s Conclusions and Recommendations for the AICHR.128
These include:
(1) conduct capacity-building programmes; (2) conduct
greater peer-to-peer interaction between relevant
stakeholders; (3) compile a regional reference guide in
respect of the AHRD, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD, and the role of
the judiciary in the promotion and protection of the rule of
law and human rights; (4) enhance effective access to justice
and legal remedies by strengthening the provision of legal aid
in the region; and (5) consult and/or collaborate with other
ASEAN bodies and entities associated with ASEAN,
including civil society organisations, to realise these
recommendations.129
While these initiatives all represent substantial strides for
ASEAN, they are not being fully embraced without hesitation. For
example, at the 2017 annual CACJ meeting held after the
125. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding
International Human Rights Law, HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (Mar. 15, 2017),
http://hrrca.org/aichrs-first-judicial-colloquium-on-the-sharing-of-good-practices-regardinginternational-human-rights-law/.
126. Press Release: AICHR Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding
International Human Rights Law 13-15 March 2017, ASEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS. (Mar. 17, 2017), http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-aichrjudicial-colloquium-on-the-sharing-of-good-practices-regarding-international-human-rights-law13-15-march-2017/.
127. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding
International Human Rights Law, supra note 125.
128. Press Release: AICHR Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding
International Human Rights Law 13-15 March 2017, supra note 126.
129. AICHR’s First Judicial Colloquium on the Sharing of Good Practices Regarding
International Human Rights Law, supra note 125.
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AICHR/CACJ Colloquium, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Brunei stated:
“We must keep an open mind on the issues that we could and
should discuss. If an area of focus is brought to our attention,
it is our duty to consider whether it is proper for us to make
it a part of the council’s work. For example, the recent
[AICHR] Judicial Colloquium on the sharing of Good
Practices Regarding International Human Rights Law in
Kuala Lumpur sought greater cooperation between the
AICHR and the Council on issues of human rights law. The
question we must answer is whether this is the appropriate
forum for such an issue to be discussed.”130
The Chief Justice of the Philippines has also expressed some hesitation
regarding unifying and integrating laws across the region. She
explained that this may be complicated in light of existing structural
systems between the countries,131 stating, “even explaining how
processes work takes time,” and that the Philippines itself is “still
grappling with the question of our own jurisdiction.”132
Regardless of existing hesitation towards integration and
implementation of human rights law in the region, the work of the
CACJ is significant. By sharing practices, integrating laws, and
teaching international human rights norms, the CACJ can strengthen
domestic judiciaries, which can, in turn, ensure better means of redress
for domestic human rights violations. The very fact that justices from
the highest courts of member states are discussing human rights laws
is an important step for ASEAN and highlights the ways in which
human rights norms are beginning to gain more acceptance within the
region. What remains is figuring out how to apply this momentum
towards overcoming principles of non-interference under the
“ASEAN Way” to create a legal mechanism to redress human rights
abuses.

130. James Kon, Brunei Hosts Asean Chief Justices’ Meet, BORNEO
BULLETIN (Mar. 25, 2017), https://borneobulletin.com.bn/brunei-hosts-asean-chief-justices-meet/.
131. Buena Bernal, ASEAN Chief Justices Sign Accord for Judicial Cooperation, RAPPLER
(Mar. 9, 2015, 11:25PM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85990-asean-chief-justices-accord.
132. Buena Bernal, Sereno: Long Way to Go for Liberalized Legal Profession, RAPPLER
(Mar. 2, 2015, 11:59 AM), https://www.rappler.com/nation/85481-sereno-liberalized-legalprofession.

(7)52.1_SARWAR (DO NOT DELETE)

50

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/30/2019 9:49 PM

[Vol. 52:27

IV. CREATING AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM
IN ASEAN AND THE STRENGTHS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTIONS
A. Progressive Implementation of Human Rights Mechanisms
Yvonne Xin Wang noted in her 2015 article Contextualizing
Universal Human Rights: An Integrated Human Rights Framework
for ASEAN that many of the existing human rights systems took an
incremental approach towards establishing a concrete regional human
rights mechanism complete with a convention, a commission, and a
court.133 In fact, none of these regional systems adopted all three
instruments at once, instead taking years between introducing each
new instrument before culminating in the implementation of the
strongest human rights instrument of all—human rights court.134 The
African Charter, for example, which established the African
Commission, was created 18 years after the Organization of African
Unity (now known as the African Union) was first formed.135 The
Charter came into force in 1986,136 and, after much reluctance on the
part of the member states, the African Court on Human and People’s
Rights was created in 1998.137
Wang posits that a progressive approach would particularly suit
ASEAN, even at the cost of waiting for stronger human rights
mechanisms to be implemented:
Given ASEAN’s resistance towards adversarial or coercive
intrusions into state sovereignty and a lack of political will
for establishing binding enforcement mechanisms, the
ASEAN Commission should start by engaging governments
using mechanisms that appear least intrusive to state
sovereignty. Some may argue that we should not give up on
pushing for stronger mechanisms just because it is politically
difficult. Indeed, material inducements signal that the
community condemns the proscribed behavior, and the
absence of punishment might signal that the community does
not strongly support the norm. However, this expressive
133. Wang, supra note 4, at 401–02.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 402.
136. Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the Gap?: The Role of Regional and National Human Rights
Institutions in the Asia Pacific, 13 ASIA-PAC. L. & POL’Y J., no. 1, 2011, at 174, 188.
137. Id. at 190.
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value of punishment might work only when the proscribed
behavior is already “broadly, unequivocally, and manifestly
understood as inappropriate.” Premature punishment, prior
to the institutionalization of a norm, “can also result in a
(greater) backlash by norm violators who feel unjustly
penalized.”138
Thus, by first implementing less intrusive steps, with the ultimate
goal of establishing a regional human rights court, ASEAN can ensure
that their initiatives will be met with the political will and level of
social acceptance necessary for such instruments to be successful.
ASEAN states, long known for their reluctance to acquiesce to outside
intervention, would be far more apt to accept measures incrementally.
One such measure is the implementation of ADR proceedings.
Studies indicate that ADR has had great successes as a means of
conflict resolution in Southeast Asia,139 and may be a form of
resolution better suited for parties less receptive to outside
intervention.140 Additionally, instituting a mechanism for ADR is
feasible in the short-term, as existing ASEAN instruments already
have provisions in place for utilizing ADR.
B. Alternative Dispute Resolutions
In the case of ASEAN, where high importance is placed on
respect for the internal affairs of other members, non-confrontation,
quiet diplomacy, non-recourse to use or threat to use of force, and
decision-making through consensus,141 traditional forms of
adversarial judicial processes may not be best suited to address every
conflict. With these values in mind, it also seems unlikely that member
states would respond enthusiastically to being taken to court by an
outside regional body and made to litigate their disputes in the near
future.
138. Wang, supra note 4, at 407 (footnotes omitted).
139. See, e.g., Joel Lee, Culture and Its Importance in Mediation, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
317, 324–25 (2016) (discussing how mediation has been used for dispute resolution in Singapore);
Sorawit Limparangsri & Prachya Yuprasert, Arbitration and Mediation in ASEAN: Laws and
Practice
from
a
Thai
Perspective,
ASEAN
LAW
ASSOCIATION
https://www.aseanlawassociation.org/docs/w4_thai.pdf (“Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has
been in existence in Thailand, at least, since Thai history was first recorded in writing. Pursuing an
amicable solution to a dispute will come as a natural choice once Thai people confront a dispute.”).
140. See Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a
Rights-Based Approach Through the ECHR, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 607, 612 (2015).
141. Phan, supra note 3, at 113.
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ADR presents a promising alternate means of conflict resolution
for ASEAN states. ADR refers to “processes other than a judicial
determination, in which a third person assists parties to resolve a
dispute.”142 Settling disputes through ADR “increases the chances of
preserving continuing relationships . . . both personal and commercial
as well as protecting reputations.”143 Characteristics of ADR “such as
‘consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and
emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity,
access, and. . . justice’”144 align with many characteristics of the
ASEAN Way such as consensus, autonomy, and quiet diplomacy.
As a means of dispute settlement, ADR seems well-suited for
ASEAN countries—ADR is known for its successes in dispute
resolutions in multi-cultural communities145 and some even argue that
mediation has its roots in Asian culture.146 In fact, ASEAN has
developed a dispute settlement mechanism utilizing ADR for
economic disputes,147 and ADR is already successfully used by
member states for the negotiation of business-related conflicts.148
1. An Overview of ADR
In ADR processes, the role of the neutral third party can vary
depending on the form of dispute resolution used and generally falls
between two categories. In evaluative (also known as “determinative”)
forms of ADR “the ADR practitioner has a role in investigating the
dispute, which may also include the hearing of formal evidence, and
determining a resolution which may be internally enforceable,
externally enforceable or unenforceable.”149 A common form of
determinative ADR is arbitration,150 where the arbiter hears evidence
142. TRACEY RAYMOND, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW CONTEXT 2 (2006),
http://www.asiapacificmediationforum.org/resources/2006/raymond.pdf.
143. McGregor, supra note 140, at 612 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases) 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669–70 (1995)).
145. Nancy Erbe, The Global Popularity and Promise of Facilitative ADR, 18 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 343, 346 (2004).
146. Lee, supra note 139, at 325.
147. See ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism art. 1 (June 18, 2012),
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20141217102933.pdf.
148. See Marquise Clarke, Successfully Resolving Commercial Disputes: An Overview of
Arbitration in ASEAN, ASEAN Briefing (June 28, 2016),
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2016/06/28/asean-arbitration.html.
149. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 3.
150. Id.
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from both sides in order to decide an outcome which may or may not
be binding upon the parties.151
In contrast, in facilitative ADR processes the “third party’s
intervention relates to the process of resolution rather than the content
of the dispute or the terms of its resolution.”152 Thus, the neutral third
party guiding the resolution functions less as a trier-of-fact and more
as a facilitator to communications. The most common form of
facilitative ADR is mediation, in which the mediator fosters
communication between parties in order to reach a non-binding
settlement mutually agreed to by all.153
In practice, “ADR processes may also be classified as hybrid or
combined processes.”154 For example, differences between varieties
of “hybrid models and the many variants within each model[]
includ[e] whether engagement is voluntary or mandatory; . . . whether
it is integrated into the judicial system; whether the decisions reached
are binding; [and] whether the process is public or private.”155
ADR proceedings can be kept confidential, though critics argue
that a lack of transparency “may limit the social reforming potential
of the law and work to the disadvantage of those the law aims to
protect.”156 Proponents, however, argue that “ADR[] is championed
on grounds that it advances self-determination and autonomy and
empowers parties to ‘control the outcome’. On this justification, the
major critiques of arbitration—for example, its privacy and
confidentiality—are seen as advantages to party choice and control of
the dispute.”157
Differences may also exist in whether ADR processes are
interest-based or rights-based. In interest-based ADR, a resolution is
sought which reflects the underlying needs and interests of the parties
in question.158 In rights-based ADR, the resolution is implemented
“with reference to perceived rights and duties for example, as
articulated in law.”159
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See ADR Types & Benefits, CAL. CTS.: THE JUD. BRANCH
http://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
154. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 3.
155. McGregor, supra note 140, at 615 (footnotes omitted).
156. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 2.
157. McGregor, supra note 140, at 612 (footnotes omitted).
158. RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 7.
159. Id.

OF

CAL.,

(7)52.1_SARWAR (DO NOT DELETE)

54

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/30/2019 9:49 PM

[Vol. 52:27

2. Models of ADR Best Suited Under the “ASEAN Way” and
Human Rights Enforcement
As noted by Tracey Raymond, Principal Training and Policy
Officer and Principal Investigation/Conciliation Officer with the
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ADR
in the human right’s context should, at least in part, be rights-based.160
The ADR facilitator in human rights conflicts would have to consider
the relevant human rights laws and how other disputes have been
handled by courts or tribunals.161
A solely rights-based approach, however, may not be the answer.
Disadvantages of a rights-based resolution process include the fact
that, in more closely mirroring traditional judicial processes,
resolutions typically focus more on customary forms of remedy such
as restitution.162 In doing so, more creative or meaningful outcomes
for the parties are not explored.163 In addition, rights-based ADR “can
include competitive, adversarial negotiation techniques which can be
detrimental to any ongoing relationship between the parties and can
intensify and entrench conflict.”164
As many ASEAN states value autonomy, non-interference, quiet
diplomacy and consensus,165 they may not be receptive to an overly
adversarial rights-based form of ADR. Raymond argues, however,
that “within this rights-based framework there is a place for the
philosophy and skills associated with interest-based ADR.”166 She
notes that there are numerous advantages to having more facilitative
or interest-based negotiations:
The role of the third party in an interest-based approach is
characterised by interventions which elicit the needs and
interests of both parties, encourage parties to understand each
other’s views and aim to maintain constructive dialogue
through which the parties can generate creative resolution
options to address mutual needs and interests. An interestbased approach to resolution is seen to contribute to
maintenance of relationships, encourage an appreciation of
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Phan, supra note 3, at 113.
RAYMOND, supra note 142, at 7.
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different perspectives, educate parties about alternative ways
to deal with conflict and increase the potential for
resolution.167
Raymond postulates that ADR for human rights disputes should
incorporate aspects of both interest-based and rights-based ADR.168
For example, interest-based approaches may be best suited for dealing
with impasses within negotiations, while a focus on rights may be
better suited at later stages in negotiation, particularly if interest-based
ADR has been less successful.169
In a survey of ADR initiatives in the Balkans, Cameroon, Nepal
and the Ukraine, Fulbright Distinguished Chair and conflict resolution
expert Nancy Erbe also advocates for a somewhat hybridized version
of ADR.170 Respondents identified that “critical blocks to international
development include predominance of the evaluative, or expert,
approach, along with failure to facilitate effective partnerships with
communities.”171 Instead, Erbe recommends a facilitative ADR
approach but with a directive mediator: “the most popular leaders of
cross-cultural processes are portrayed as balancing receptivity and
rapport with assertive direction. Respondents from several regions
mention direct, detailed questioning as important to careful
listening.”172
Erbe notes that ADR is particularly well-suited for “transitional
and emerging democracies, where the rule of law and legal institutions
require capacity building.”173 In surveying 115 respondents who
engaged in ADR because of ethnic conflicts in Nepal, the Balkans,
Cameroon, and the Ukraine, she found that ADR is particularly
effective at empowering and giving voice to “communit[ies] in the
face of corrupt and self-interested political leadership.”174 She also
found that “additional interventions that are different from, but
complementary to trials, such as facilitating culturally accepted
mechanisms of justice should be considered . . . [S]ocial
reconstruction may not occur when people are faced with judicial
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
See Erbe, supra note 145, at 369–70.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 358.
Id.
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decisions that do not correspond to their perceptions of what
happened, i.e., their ‘truth.’”175
In an article discussing ADR initiatives in Singapore (where ADR
has been used since 1994 in forums including courts and community
mediation centers set up by the Ministry of Justice),176 anthropologist
Dr. Joel Lee notes that “it was possible to preserve the usefulness of
the interests-based model of conflict resolution—its functional
paradigm—and harmonize it with the culture of Singapore in its
application—its operational paradigm.”177 He posits that ADR
practitioners can “contextualize the interests-based model for their
own cultures.”178
In Singapore, for example, interest-based ADR emphasizes social
hierarchy, in that the mediator has high social status, is at the center of
the mediation process, and provides guidance to the parties.179 The
processes prioritize observing group interests alongside selfinterest.180 Communications and conduct emphasize preserving
harmony and relationships—this includes steering away from
uncomfortable topics when needed, as “[u]nearthing issues that should
be left unspoken may lead to embarrassment and disengagement from
the process.”181
Lee rejects the notion that certain values can automatically be
prescribed to Asian or “Eastern” versus “Western” countries,182 and
also advocates for interest-based but context-driven ADR:
[W]here the circumstances call for it, it is possible to
manifest the interests-based model in a less facilitative, if not
non-facilitative, manner. In fact, one could even practice
directive/authoritative (not authoritarian) interests-based
mediation. It should be made clear that this means that
mediators may take on more of a leadership role but without
depriving parties of their power to decide how to resolve the
dispute.183

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 355–356 (alterations in original).
Lee, supra note 139, at 324.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328–29.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. at 331.
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ADR provides a strong choice for dispute resolution of human
rights issues for ASEAN because of its flexibility (i.e., it can be
tailored to suit the conflict and parties in question) and because of its
strength in conflicts involving multicultural parties. It is also a realistic
option for ASEAN, as the ASEAN Charter already contains provisions
for utilization of ADR to resolve conflicts.184
3. ADR within the ASEAN Legal Instruments
Ideally, ADR would be a preliminary means of dispute resolution
for citizens of ASEAN states. Once ASEAN has developed a regional
human rights court and states have come to accept its jurisdiction,
disputes unresolved through ADR could be transferred to the court for
binding adjudication.
Existing ASEAN instruments have mechanisms which call for
ADR in dispute resolution.185 As outlined below, some minor changes
to ASEAN instruments, coupled with the development of ASEAN
organizations, would establish ADR as a means of dispute resolution
and help lay the groundwork for the development of a regional human
rights court.
Article 24 of the ASEAN Charter, entitled “Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms in Specific Instruments” mandates that “[d]isputes
relating to specific ASEAN instruments shall be settled through the
mechanisms and procedures provided for in such instruments.”186
Neither the AICHR terms of reference nor the AHRD, however,
provide for a dispute settlement mechanism in the event of a violation
of the AHRD.187 Article 25 of the ASEAN Charter addresses ASEAN
instruments which do not themselves provide for dispute settlement,
stating: “Where not otherwise specifically provided, appropriate
dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, shall be
established for disputes which concern the interpretation or
application of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments.”188 The
question of how such dispute settlement mechanisms are to be
established remains unanswered.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 23–28.
See id.
Id. at art. 24.
See Terms of Reference, supra note 57.
ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 25.
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In 2011, ASEAN created the ASEAN Institute for Peace and
Reconciliation (AIPR).189 This organization shows promise to be a
future resource for the AICHR to facilitate dispute resolution in the
event that a complaint arises regarding a human rights violation.190
Unfortunately, however, the AIPR “is still in its formative stage”191
and has been largely inactive since its establishment. Though the
organization has conducted a number of capacity-building symposia
on a range of peace-related topics,192 the AIPR still lacks a website
and only just instituted an Executive Director in October of 2017.193 It
is clear that the AIPR needs to progress as an organization and develop
an expertise in ADR before becoming a realistic resource in dispute
resolution.
In the event that ADR does become utilized to resolve human
rights abuses in the region, Article 27 of the ASEAN Charter provides
a means of ensuring compliance with the finding, recommendation, or
decision found through the dispute resolution.194 Article 27 reads:
1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN
Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall
monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations
or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement
mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit.
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the
findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from
an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the
matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision.195

189. Elizabeth P. Buensuceso, The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and Its Role
in Preventing Crises, UN CHRONICLE (Oct. 2017) https://unchronicle.un.org/article/aseaninstitute-peace-and-reconciliation-and-its-role-preventing-crises.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. ASEAN Welcomes First Executive Director of AIPR, ASEAN: ASEAN SECRETARIAT
NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017), http://asean.org/asean-welcomes-first-executive-director-of-aipr/.
194. Hao Duy Phan, Procedures for Peace: Building Mechanisms for Dispute Settlement and
Conflict Management Within ASEAN, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 57 (2013).
195. ASEAN Charter, supra note 51, at art. 27.
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Article 26 states that any unresolved disputes should also be referred
to the Summit for a decision.196
The ASEAN Summit is comprised of the Heads of State or
Government from each member state, and serves as the “supreme
policy-making body of ASEAN.”197 As noted by Phan, the “ASEAN
Summit is not a court or an arbitral tribunal. It is a policy-making body
that continues to operate according to the ASEAN Way, including,
most importantly, the norm of decision-making on a consensus
basis.”198 Unfortunately, this consensus-based decision-making
process means that if any of the parties do not agree with a
determination, no decision can be reached.199
This is where an ASEAN Court, once established, could come
into play. Article 26 should refer unresolved conflicts to the regional
court. A court could also ensure compliance under Article 27, by
issuing orders and punishments for any party’s failure to adhere to
binding decisions. A court could also serve as the next step in the event
that ADR fails to settle a dispute. In this regard, Wang proposes that
ASEAN follow the actions of the Inter-American System:
For the Inter-American System, states are incentivized to use
[mediation] and reach an agreement. Failure to settle in
mediation would allow the Commission to take stronger
actions, such as publishing detailed public reports and nonbinding recommendations, or referring the dispute to the
Inter-American Court, if the state has accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction. The potential for private settlements makes
mediation more palatable than the following mechanisms,
which involve public shaming or formal adjudication.200
Such an approach makes sense and would allow for ADR initiatives
to serve as a natural step in the dispute settlement process once a
human rights court has been created.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at art. 26.
Id. at art. 7.
Phan, supra note 194, at 57 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 57–58.
See Wang, supra note 4, at 414 (footnotes omitted).
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4. The Case for a Human Rights Court, and Its Role Within ASEAN
and with ADR Initiatives
To be clear, this Note does not propose that changing ASEAN’s
legal instruments and implementing ADR initiatives is the ultimate
solution for ASEAN. A regional human rights court is absolutely
necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of human rights in the
Southeast Asian region.201 Strengthening the AICHR’s mandates
alone would not adequately provide the legal force needed to provide
redress for human rights violations as “even if the AICHR had
stronger protection mandates, it could not replace the role of a court
because only courts are able to provide legally binding decisions.”202
The same stands true for ADR initiatives. If ADR proceedings
rendered a nonbinding decision which was not followed by one or both
parties involved in the dispute, as mentioned above, a court could
function as an “appellate” forum where a binding decision could be
reached.203 In short, “courts provide effective and enforceable
remedies.”204
Ideally, a court would function as an independent organ of the
ASEAN human rights architecture. Such is the case in the regional
human rights system in the Americas: “While the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) undertakes ‘monitoring and
promotional activities’, including the selection and submission of
cases to the Court, the Court issues binding decisions and advisory
opinions to protect rights in danger.”205
ASEAN would still play a role in supervising and ensuring
execution of court decisions. In both the European and African human
rights mechanisms, the court is monitored and supervised respectively
by the Council of Europe and the Executive Council.206 As the
established overarching regional organization, ASEAN would have
the power and influence needed amongst its members to ensure that
all Court decisions were properly executed and complied with.

201. See Bui, supra note 22, at 135 (“[T]he most pressing rationale for an ASEAN human rights
court remains to provide adequate remedies for victims of human rights violations, something
which cannot be accomplished by other means.”).
202. Id. at 134.
203. See Wang, supra note 4, at 414.
204. Bui, supra note 22, at 134.
205. Id. at 136.
206. Id.
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The AICHR, too, would have a role to play by receiving
complaints and investigating human rights violations. In the African
and Inter-American human rights systems, the human rights
commission receives complaints from individuals and, once they pass
the “admissibility phase and merits phase,” the commission passes the
complaints to the court for adjudication.207 Both organizations have
mandates which allow for them to contact states and investigate
human rights complaints.208 To fit into the regional human rights
system, then, the AICHR would need to add a similar mandate to their
Terms of Reference which would allow them to “receive information,
communicate with governments, and undertake investigations.”209
V. CONCLUSION
ASEAN has many of the tools it needs to progress towards
creating an integrated regional human rights system. It has already
undertaken initiatives to improve domestic laws, has provisions for
ADR initiatives to settle disputes, and, most importantly, has set up a
commission and declaration for human rights.210 ASEAN’s
instruments, while concerning in their adherence to traditional ideals
of the “ASEAN Way,” need only be modified to create the groundwork
through which human rights laws can be enforced. The missing key
ingredient is an organ for human rights enforcement.
As noted by Bui, “it is probably fair to admit that the formation
of a strong judicial mechanism in any form would be premature, given
the current stage of ASEAN’s development.”211 ADR represents a
feasible and more approachable solution for ASEAN until they gain
the member state support they need to establish a human rights court.
ASEAN states, who remain reluctant to cede their sovereignty to
external intervention, would be more apt to accept ADR because of its
flexible, less intrusive nature.212 ADR proceedings can be shaped
depending on the cultural environment and context within a given
dispute, and, as such, are well-suited for cross-cultural conflicts and
207. Phan, supra note 3, at 197.
208. See Bui, supra note 22, at 132; Mandates and Functions of the Commission, INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/functions.asp (last
visited Mar. 12, 2018).
209. Bui, supra note 22, at 132.
210. See ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, supra note 8, at 11.
211. Bui, supra note 22, at 133.
212. See Phan, supra note 194, at 53.
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negotiations with reluctant parties.213 If successfully implemented,
ADR initiatives would also help ASEAN states warm up to the idea of
regional human rights enforcement, bringing them closer to initiating
and accepting a human rights court.214
In the short-term, implementation of ADR processes would
provide a means for individuals in ASEAN states to report and address
human rights violations.215 In the long-term, once a human rights court
has been established, ADR would still have an important role to play.
ADR can function both as the initial step in conflict resolution before
turning to binding adjudication in court, and as an alternative
procedure for conflict resolution for states or individuals who do not
want to accept the court’s jurisdiction, or for conflicts better suited for
ADR’s flexible, culture- and context-driven structure.216
Considering that ASEAN has progressed from decades of stoutly
resisting human rights initiatives to more recently creating a human
rights commission and mechanisms to unify legal frameworks
between ASEAN countries, the organization is clearly capable of and
in the process of enacting great change. Human rights norms have
become more accepted by ASEAN states, and will continue to gain
prominence in the Association’s eyes. As such, the question of a
human rights court is less of an “if,” and more of a “when” and “how.”
On the road to forming a human rights court, ASEAN still has
work to do. Following the “incremental approach,” ASEAN must
strengthen the AICHR’s protection mandate and modify their legal
instruments to recognize the non-derogable nature of key international
human rights laws.217 ASEAN should also implement ADR
proceedings for victims of human rights violations. All of these steps
will help institutionalize human rights norms within the region and
open the door towards establishing a much-needed regional human
rights court.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Wang, supra note 4, at 415.
See id. at 412.
See id. at 416.
Id. at 414.
See id. at 402.

